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APPELLATE DEFERENCE IN THE AGE OF FACTS

KENJI YOSHINO*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the question of how much appellate deference
is due to “legislative” facts, or broad social facts about the world,
established by the district courts. While it is axiomatic that “adjudicative” facts—which are the “whodunit” facts specific to a case—receive clear error deference on appeal, the Supreme Court has yet to
address the degree of deference due to legislative facts. While the
dominant view among appellate courts is that legislative facts should
only receive de novo review, the practice of the courts has in actuality
been much more fitful and inconsistent. The standard may be
unsettled in part because the two extant alternatives—clear error and
de novo review—both raise serious concerns. This Article proposes an
intermediate “significant weight” standard, in which the deference
accorded to a finding below corresponds to the degree of adversarial
testing to which the finding was subjected.

* Chief Justice Earl Warren Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University
School of Law. This Article arose out of the James Goold Cutler Lecture at William & Mary
Law School. It benefited greatly from comments received on the occasion of the lecture, as
well as at subsequent workshops at the New York University School of Law and the
University of Chicago Law School. I thank participants in all those events and Jessica
Moldovan for her excellent research assistance. I also gratefully acknowledge the financial
support of the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in the age of facts. Courtesy of the digital revolution, more
people can access more facts with more ease than ever before in human history.1 The great democratization of fact-finding has granted
us the capacity to make more informed decisions about myriad
topics—to be, if not experts, better-educated laity. Alongside the
culture of fact, however, we have seen the rise of what might be
termed the culture of facticity. In this culture of contrivance, we
seem increasingly entitled not just to our own opinions, but also to
our own facts, and increasingly encouraged to believe that facts are
not stubborn things, but rather pliant or even complaisant ones.
These cultures of fact and facticity have inevitable ramifications
for the law. In this Article, I bite off a piece of one fact-related conundrum that is not new,2 but increasingly urgent. I concern myself
with how broad facts about the world should be established and
reviewed by judges in an adversarial system. While it may at times
seem I am chewing more than I have bitten off, my hope is that the
Article will open onto a suite of questions—from the question of how
courts know, to how law knows, to how we, as human beings, know.
Within our federal system, district courts have a special factfinding capacity. According to conventional wisdom, their institutional competence means their findings of fact are reviewed for clear
error, while their findings of law are reviewed de novo. Yet this tidy
maxim does not adequately describe current realities. We can see
this best by returning to Kenneth Culp Davis’s path-marking 1942
article, which distinguished “adjudicative facts” from “legislative

1. See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016: DIGITAL DIVIDENDS
6 (2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2016 [https://perma.cc/ E6DU-XC5Y]
(“Digital technologies have dramatically expanded the information base, lowered information
costs, and created information goods. This has facilitated searching, matching, and sharing
of information and contributed to greater organization and collaboration among economic
agents—influencing how firms operate, people seek opportunities, and citizens interact with
their governments.”).
2. See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, “There is a Book Out ...”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption
of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1542-43 (1987) (describing the “dramatic and
broad effect” that judicial acceptance of disputed legislative facts has had on the development
of law, particularly in the area of child custody law).
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facts.”3 Adjudicative facts are “facts concerning immediate parties—what the parties did, what the circumstances were, what the
background conditions were.”4 These facts have also been called
“case-specific”5 or “historical”6 or even “whodunit”7 facts. Legislative
facts—sometimes described as “social”8 facts—are, on the other
hand, “facts which are utilized for informing a court’s legislative
judgment on questions of law and policy.”9 An adjudicative fact
might provide the answer to whether a driver exceeded the speed
limit, whether a signature was forged, or whether a person read a
contract before signing it. Cognate legislative facts might clarify
whether underage drivers are more likely to speed, whether forged
signatures are easy to detect, or whether people generally sign
standardized contracts without reading them. To be clear, calling
these “legislative” facts is a hopeless (but hopelessly entrenched)
misnomer. As used in this Article and in this literature, legislative
facts are found by the courts, not by the legislature—the adjective
does not denominate the source of the fact, but rather the function
of the fact in the judicial process.
Armed with this distinction, we see that appellate courts
generally grant clear error deference only to adjudicative facts.10
The consensus among appellate courts is that legislative facts are
reviewed de novo. However, the Supreme Court has never gone
beyond dictum on this point, and its own practice has been inconsistent. Part I maps the disarray.
In Part II, I examine proposed resolutions of this uncertainty. In
considering fixes, courts and commentators have largely restricted
their debate to which of two extant standards—de novo or clear
3. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942).
4. Id. at 402.
5. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional
Rights Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1185, 1193 (2013).
6. See, e.g., Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1982).
7. Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255,
1255 (2012).
8. Borgmann, supra note 5, at 1187.
9. Davis, supra note 3, at 404.
10. Importantly, the courts sometimes do not grant clear error deference even to
adjudicative facts, as when the “constitutional facts” doctrine is implicated. See infra notes
170-80 and accompanying text.
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error review—is more appropriate for legislative facts. Yet these
standards were developed for the law/fact distinction, not for the
fact/fact distinction. I contend that neither de novo review nor clear
error review is appropriate.
Part III proposes a new intermediate standard of review. This
“significant weight” standard would accord a floating level of deference to the district court’s fact-finding with regard to legislative
facts. The degree of deference would correspond to the degree of
adversarial testing (broadly construed) to which the legislative facts
had been subjected.
I. THE STATUS QUO
Trial courts issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.11 Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), “[f]indings of fact, whether
based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”12 Rule 52
makes no distinction between the kinds of facts in question.13
Conclusions of law, in contrast, are reviewed de novo—the district
court receives no deference.14
A. The Supreme Court, in Decision and Dictum
To understand how clear error deference works in the general
case, consider the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City.15 In that case, the district court found that the
plaintiff had been denied a position with the city because of her
sex.16 The court of appeals reversed because it disagreed with many
of the lower court’s findings.17 The Supreme Court reinstated the
11. See FED . R. CIV. P. 52. The critical question of how jury findings are treated on appeal
is beyond the scope of this Article.
12. Id. 52(a)(6).
13. See id. 52.
14. See United States v. Clarke, 134 S. Ct. 2361, 2369 (2014) (holding that on questions
of law, “the Court of Appeals has no cause to defer to the District Court”).
15. 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
16. Id. at 568.
17. Id. at 571.
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district court’s ruling, noting that “[w]here there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot
be clearly erroneous.”18 Clear error deference required more than
simple disagreement with the trial court’s findings.19 “A finding is
‘clearly erroneous,’” the Court had observed in 1948, “when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.”20
Though the Court had no reason to term it so, the trial court’s
core finding in Anderson was manifestly an adjudicative fact, as it
pertained to an action specific to the plaintiff in the case.21 It is not
obvious that the Court intended Anderson’s clear error deference to
extend to legislative facts. Indeed, during the next Term, the Court
suggested in dictum in Lockhart v. McCree that legislative facts
should not receive clear error deference on appeal.22 The Court in
Lockhart addressed the constitutionality of a jury from which
prospective jurors with a categorical objection to the death penalty
had been excluded.23 On habeas, the district court had found “that
‘death qualification’ produced juries that ‘were more prone to
convict’ capital defendants than ‘non-death-qualified’ juries.”24
Finding that the “death qualification” violated the “fair-cross-section
and impartiality requirements of the Sixth and the Fourteenth
Amendments,” the court granted habeas relief, and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.25 In reversing, the Court included a footnote
stating:
McCree argues that the “factual” findings of the District Court
and the Eighth Circuit on the effects of “death qualification” may
be reviewed by this Court only under the “clearly erroneous”
standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Because we do
not ultimately base our decision today on the invalidity of the
lower courts’ “factual” findings, we need not decide the “standard
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 574.
See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739 (2015).
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 568.
476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3 (1986).
Id. at 165.
Id. at 167 (quoting Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1323 (E.D. Ark. 1983)).
Id. at 167-68.
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of review” issue. We are far from persuaded, however, that the
“clearly erroneous” standard of Rule 52(a) applies to the kind of
“legislative” facts at issue here. The difficulty with applying such
a standard to “legislative” facts is evidenced here by the fact that
at least one other Court of Appeals, reviewing the same social
science studies as introduced by McCree, has reached a conclusion contrary to that of the Eighth Circuit.26

This footnote is the closest the Court has come to ruling on the
issue. As one commentator has stated, “[i]t is unpardonable that the
Supreme Court has not established a principled, explicit framework
for the judicial reception and evaluation of such facts.”27
Appellate courts both before and after Lockhart have taken the
“no deference” view. In 1982, Judge Posner discussed this issue
when Jewish basketball players challenged an athletic association’s
rule that prohibited basketball players from wearing yarmulkes
during games.28 In ruling for the plaintiffs, the district court found
that insecurely fastened yarmulkes did not pose a significant hazard
to basketball players.29 On appeal, Judge Posner wrote for a majority to reject that claim.30 On a petition for rehearing, he acknowledged that the panel had been “accused of having failed to apply the
clearly-erroneous rule to the district court’s finding.”31 He elaborated: “That rule, however, is designed for the review of findings of
‘historical,’ not ‘legislative,’ fact.”32 Judge Posner offered no citations
for this claim.33
In 1994, the First Circuit took a similar tack, now bolstering its
position with a citation to the dictum in Lockhart.34 It found that
“[t]he clear error standard does not apply, however, when the factfinding at issue concerns ‘legislative,’ as opposed to ‘historical’
facts.”35 On this ground, it stated that it need not defer to the
district court’s finding that the distinction between sentencing for
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 168 n.3 (citation omitted).
Borgmann, supra note 5, at 1248.
Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1031 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1036.
Id.
See id.
United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 740 (1st Cir. 1994).
Id.
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cocaine base and for cocaine powder was racially discriminatory.36
Other appellate courts have expressed uncertainty about what level
of deference to apply, while acknowledging that different levels may
be appropriate.37 To my knowledge, no federal court has expressly
held that appellate courts must give legislative facts clear error
deference.
It might appear, then, that we are just waiting for the Supreme
Court to make a latent consensus patent—that findings of legislative facts, like conclusions of law, receive no deference. Indeed, a
leading monograph has flatly asserted that “appellate courts revisit
legislative fact questions de novo.”38
B. The Supreme Court, in Practice
As a matter of practice, however, the Supreme Court has not
consistently adhered to the view that legislative facts should be
reviewed de novo. This incongruity can be seen across the ideological spectrum.
1. Justice Alito Supports Clear Error Deference for a
Legislative Fact
Writing for a majority of the Court in 2015 in Glossip v. Gross,
Justice Alito determined that Oklahoma’s use of a three-drug
protocol to execute prisoners did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and unusual punishments.39 As Justice Scalia
put it, the case had a “Groundhog Day” quality—the Court had
upheld a three-drug lethal injection protocol in the 2008 case of Baze
v. Rees.40 In the Baze protocol, the first drug, a barbiturate, rendered
the prisoner unconscious; the second drug paralyzed him; and the
third drug stopped his heart.41

36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1075 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting this distinction
but declining to opine on its validity due to its irrelevance to the case at hand).
38. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FACTS 45 (2008).
39. 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739 (2015).
40. Id. at 2746 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
41. Baze, 553 U.S. at 44.
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In the aftermath of that case, death penalty abolitionists successfully lobbied pharmaceutical companies to withdraw the first
drug in the Baze protocol—sodium thiopental.42 States substituted
a different barbiturate—pentobarbital.43 The abolitionists again
convinced the manufacturer of the drug to make it unavailable for
executions.44 The states pivoted to yet another drug—midazolam.45
In Glossip, the Court addressed whether midazolam was an
adequate substitute for the sodium thiopental approved in Baze.46
The Glossip petitioners observed that unlike sodium thiopental and
pentobarbital, which are barbiturates, midazolam is a sedative (a
benzodiazepine in the same class as Valium or Xanax).47 As such,
they argued, it did not consistently render the prisoner insensate.48
On habeas, the district court held a three-day hearing.49 It found
that the 500-milligram dose of midazolam used “would make it a
virtual certainty that any individual [would] be at a sufficient level
of unconsciousness to resist the noxious stimuli which could occur
from the application of the second and third drugs.”50 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed.51
Justice Alito’s majority opinion affirmed the Tenth Circuit on two
grounds, only one of which is relevant here.52 The Court observed
that “[t]he District Court did not commit clear error when it found
that midazolam is highly likely to render a person unable to feel
pain during an execution.”53 Justice Alito offered four justifications
for why such deference would be appropriate. First, he observed
the high degree of deference required by clear error review, which
42. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2734.
46. Id. at 2731.
47. Id. at 2783 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 2731 (majority opinion).
49. Id. at 2735.
50. Id. at 2736 (quoting Transcript of Court’s Ruling, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-0665-F,
2014 WL 7671680 (Dec. 22, 2014), in Joint Appendix at 43, 77, Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct.
2726 (2015) (No. 14-7955)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2737-38. Justice Alito also observed that Baze required the petitioners to show
that “any risk of harm was substantial when compared to a known and available alternative
method of execution.” Id. at 2738. He found that the petitioners had failed to carry that
burden. Id.
53. Id. at 2739.
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does not permit an appellate court “to overturn a finding ‘simply
because [we are] convinced that [we] would have decided the case
differently.’”54 Second, he contended that the petitioners bore the
burden of persuasion.55 Third, he noted that other lower courts had
reached the same conclusion.56 Finally, he maintained that
“challenges to lethal injection protocols test the boundaries of the
authority and competency of federal courts.”57 He elaborated that
“federal courts should not ‘embroil [themselves] in ongoing scientific
controversies beyond their expertise.’”58
Justice Alito invoked Anderson for the propriety of clear error
deference.59 Yet Anderson, as noted, applied that deference to an
adjudicative fact.60 The central finding of fact in Glossip—that midazolam was a knockout drug—was, in contrast, a legislative fact.61
The issue was not whether midazolam had successfully rendered a
particular prisoner unconscious, but whether it generally rendered
“any individual” unconscious.62 Nevertheless, Justice Alito’s majority opinion stated that this finding drew clear error deference.63
That view appeared to be unanimous. Justice Sotomayor, in her
vigorous dissent for four Justices, agreed that clear error deference
applied.64
2. Justice Alito Rejects Clear Error Deference for Legislative
Facts
Two years earlier, however, Justice Alito had opined that it would
be absurd for an appellate court to accord clear error deference to a
district court’s findings of legislative facts. In 2013, the Supreme
54. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
573 (1985)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2739-40.
57. Id. at 2740.
58. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008)). This
statement is a bit confounding, because the tribunal in which the facts were established was
also, of course, a federal court.
59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 15-21.
61. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732.
62. See id. at 2740-41.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Court handed down two cases relating to same-sex marriage on the
same day—United States v. Windsor65 and Hollingsworth v. Perry.66
In Windsor, the Court struck down the federal Defense of Marriage
Act, which denied federal benefits to same-sex couples validly
married under state law.67 In Hollingsworth, the Court confronted
the more basic question—whether state bans on same-sex marriage
were constitutional.68 The Hollingsworth Court determined that the
case was not justiciable, as the petitioner lacked standing.69 It
therefore did not reach the merits, leaving the district court opinion
as the final disposition.70 That district court had invalidated
California’s ban on same-sex marriage after holding a twelve-day
trial71 and issuing eighty findings of fact.72
In an unusual move, Justice Alito employed his Windsor dissent
to castigate the trial in Hollingsworth. He stated that Hollingsworth
involved whether the Court should adopt a traditional “conjugal”
view of marriage (which would exclude same-sex couples) or a more
novel “consent-based” view of marriage (which would include
them).73 He said that resolving the debate between these two
conceptions lay beyond the competence of the judiciary, which
should not “decide a question that philosophers, historians, social
scientists, and theologians are better qualified to explore.”74 He then
observed:
The degree to which this question is intractable to typical
judicial processes of decisionmaking was highlighted by the trial
in Hollingsworth v. Perry. In that case, the trial judge, after
receiving testimony from some expert witnesses, purported to
make “findings of fact” on such questions as why marriage came
65. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
66. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
67. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
68. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
69. Id.
70. Id. (“Because we find that petitioners do not have standing, we have no authority to
decide this case on the merits, and neither did the Ninth Circuit.”).
71. Id. at 2660.
72. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 953-91 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
73. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
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to be, what marriage is, and the effect legalizing same-sex
marriage would have on opposite-sex marriage.
At times, the trial reached the heights of parody, as when the
trial judge questioned his ability to take into account the views
of great thinkers of the past because they were unavailable to
testify in person in his courtroom.
And, if this spectacle were not enough, some professors of
constitutional law have argued that we are bound to accept the
trial judge’s findings—including those on major philosophical
questions and predictions about the future—unless they are
“clearly erroneous.” Only an arrogant legal culture that has lost
all appreciation of its own limitations could take such a suggestion seriously.75

As in Glossip, Justice Alito expressed concern about whether the
question presented lay within the competence of the judiciary.76 Yet
that uncertainty made him take diametrically opposed positions in
the two cases. In Glossip, the uncertainty led him to defer to the
lower court.77 In Hollingsworth, by contrast, the uncertainty led him
to state that such deference could not be taken seriously.78
Of course, the facts found in Glossip and Hollingsworth are
intuitively different. Glossip presented a narrow scientific question:
does midazolam render prisoners unconscious?79 Hollingsworth
presented a broad sociological question: what is marriage?80
Nevertheless, for the purposes of legal rules of deference, the two
findings have three crucial commonalities. First, even though one
might be broader than the other, both related to legislative facts.
Second, under the law governing each case, the answers were
potentially outcome determinative.81 The district courts therefore
75. Id. at 2718 n.7 (citations omitted).
76. See id. at 2718.
77. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
79. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015).
80. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013).
81. As the material quoted above suggests, Justice Alito did not appear to believe that the
district court’s factual determinations in Hollingsworth were necessary, much less relevant,
to the legal questions posed. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. This position is
puzzling. It has been established through a line of canonical cases that the “right to marry,”
while unenumerated in the Constitution, is nonetheless a fundamental right. See, e.g., Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1987) (invoking the fundamental right to marry in striking
down regulations limiting inmates’ ability to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 372, 386
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had to provide them. Finally, both district courts opted to do so
using the traditional fact-finding procedures that have been deemed
to be their comparative institutional competence—hearing dueling
experts subjected to voir dire and cross-examination. In short, these
were legislative facts that the district courts had to determine, and
which they determined to the best of their institutional competence.
Nevertheless, in one case clear error deference was deemed to be
appropriate,82 while in the other, it was deemed to be ludicrous.83
3. Justice Ginsburg Supports Clear Error Deference for a
Legislative Fact
In the interests of fair play, let me observe that inconsistent
postures of deference with regard to district court findings of
legislative facts are not the special bugbear of the conservative wing
of the Court. In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court upheld a federal ban
on partial-birth abortions.84 The Court observed that Congress had
found the practice of performing partial-birth abortions to be “never
medically necessary.”85 In dissent, Justice Ginsburg observed that
this Congressional finding had been contradicted by the district
court below—as well as two other district courts.86 She wrote: “The
trial courts concluded, in contrast to Congress’ findings, that
‘significant medical authority supports the proposition that in some
circumstances, [intact D&E] is the safest procedure.’”87 She elaborated that “[t]he District Courts’ findings merit this Court’s

(1978) (striking down a requirement that certain citizens get court approval before exercising
the fundamental right to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that antimiscegenation statutes were unconstitutional infringements of the right to marry under the
Due Process clause). Justice Alito did not suggest any retreat from that view. In considering
whether that right permitted same-sex couples to marry, any court would have to subscribe
to a view about the nature of marriage. To exclude same-sex couples from marriage while
declining to answer the question would be to settle the issue by fiat without taking any
accountability for doing so.
82. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
84. 550 U.S. 124, 141 (2007).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 179 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320
F. Supp. 2d 957, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).
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respect,” appending a citation to Federal Rule of Civil Procedures
52(a) as well as to Salve Regina College v. Russell.88
Justice Ginsburg was more cautious or opaque than Justice Alito
in Glossip, eschewing any reference to “clear error deference,” and
favoring instead the formulation that the findings below “merit[ed]
this Court’s respect.”89 Yet the citations illuminated her meaning.
Rule 52(a), as seen above, sets forth the clear error standard.90
Similarly, the cited matter in Salve Regina elaborates on that
standard in unmistakable terms. The Salve Regina Court observed:
“In deference to the unchallenged superiority of the district court’s
factfinding ability, Rule 52(a) commands that a trial court’s findings
of fact ‘shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.’”91
4. Justice Ginsburg Rejects Clear Error Deference for Legislative
Facts
In United States v. Virginia, by contrast, Justice Ginsburg apparently declined to accord clear error deference to a district court
finding.92 Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg struck down the
Virginia Military Institute’s bar on admitting women. In doing so,
the Court rejected the findings of the district court. As Justice
Ginsburg acknowledged: “In support of its initial judgment for
Virginia, a judgment rejecting all equal protection objections
presented by the United States, the District Court made ‘findings’
on ‘gender-based developmental differences.’ These ‘findings’ restate
the opinions of Virginia’s expert witnesses, opinions about typically
male or typically female ‘tendencies.’”93
In a sharp dissent, Justice Scalia expatiated on the perceived lack
of deference given to the district court. He noted that the majority
“rejects (contrary to our established practice) the factual findings of
two courts below.”94 He further criticized the majority for dismissing
the lower courts’ findings “on the ground that ‘[the] findings’ restate
88. Id. (quoting Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)) (citing FED . R. CIV.
P. 52(a)).
89. See id.
90. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
91. Salve Regina Coll., 499 U.S. at 233 (quoting FED . R. CIV. P. 52(a)).
92. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
93. Id. at 541 (internal citations omitted).
94. Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the opinions of Virginia’s expert witnesses.’”95 He reflected that it
was “remarkable to criticize the District Court on the ground that
its findings rest on the evidence (i.e., the testimony of Virginia’s
witnesses)” given that this “is what findings are supposed to do.”96
He found this objection particularly noteworthy given that the
evidence in that court was “virtually uncontradicted.”97
Again, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion made no reference to
the applicable standard of review. Justice Scalia did not let this pass
without comment: “The Court simply dispenses with the evidence
submitted at trial—it never says that a single finding of the District
Court is clearly erroneous—in favor of the Justices’ own view of the
world.”98 “It is not too much to say,” Justice Scalia concluded, “that
this approach to the litigation has rendered the trial a sham.”99
Justice Scalia, then, assumed that Justice Ginsburg owed the
district court clear error deference and that she had shirked that
obligation. Yet Justice Ginsburg never conceded that she owed the
district court such deference. To the contrary, her scare quotes
around the district court’s “findings” parallel the similar quotation
marks around “findings” used by Justice Alito in Windsor when
discussing Hollingsworth,100 or, for that matter, by the Court in
Lockhart.101 It appears more likely that she felt she did not need to
defer to the broad “findings” of the district court.102

95. Id. at 585 (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 541 (majority opinion)).
96. Id. at 585.
97. Id. at 576 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1415 (W.D. Va.
1991)).
98. Id. at 585.
99. Id. at 586.
100. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
102. There is a third alternative here. Justice Ginsburg may have deemed the district
court’s factual determinations irrelevant because of the stringency of the intermediate
scrutiny standard. However, she did not formally raise the standard in Virginia to strict
scrutiny. It is at least arguable that a traditional application of intermediate scrutiny would
have required her to reject the findings of the district court.
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II. AN UNPALATABLE CHOICE
Faced with such inconsistencies, scholars have staked out positions claiming that either de novo103 or clear error deference104
should apply across the board. As I will show, however, the application of either standard to legislative facts raises serious concerns.
A. The Problem with De Novo Review
The problems with de novo review are various: such deference
ignores the institutional competence of the district courts; it fails,
relatedly, to acknowledge the limitations of appellate fact-finding;
and it creates perverse incentives for both district and appellate
courts.
1. De Novo Review Flouts the Institutional Competence of the
District Courts
It is well settled that district courts have particular institutional
competence to find facts, as reflected in Rule 52(a).105 As Borgmann
observes:
Constitutional rights claimants look to the federal courts as a
forum for dispassionate, independent review of the relevant
social facts.
Trial courts are well positioned to perform this function. Trial
judges are able to observe and even question expert witnesses as
they testify, helping them judge the credibility of expert testimony and assisting in the process of learning about often
complex and unfamiliar topics. Moreover, evidence at trial—even when it relates to social facts—is generally subjected to a
screening process, including rules of admissibility, that helps to
ensure the integrity of the facts in the record.106

103. See, e.g., John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating,
and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 514 (1986) (arguing that de
novo review should apply to legislative facts).
104. See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 5, at 1190 (arguing that clear error review should
apply to all legislative facts).
105. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
106. See Borgmann, supra note 5, at 1190 (footnotes omitted).
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In other words, the relative institutional competence of district court
judges to engage in fact-finding is well established with regard to
adjudicative facts.107 And Rule 52(a), at least, gives us no reason to
believe that the fact-finding processes used to discern adjudicative
facts will not also serve as the best means of discerning legislative
facts.108
To be sure, there are dissenting views. In a co-written article,
John Monahan and Laurens Walker have argued that trials are illsuited to the task of establishing legislative facts.109 Their main
claim is “that written briefs are a superior medium to verbal
testimony for communicating technical social science information.”110 This is because the expert “has less time to frame a precise
answer and less opportunity to refer to the primary data when
responding verbally than when writing a book or an article.”111 And
although Monahan and Walker acknowledge that bypassing trials
would lead to the loss of demeanor evidence, they argue that such
evidence is less probative with regard to legislative facts. “The
sweating, shifty-eyed witness to a criminal’s alibi may indeed be less
credible than is the calm and self-assured witness,” they colorfully
contend, “but observable nervousness on the part of an expert
presenting social science data is more likely to reflect unfamiliarity
with courtroom procedures than it is to indicate that the underlying
data are invalid.”112 In addition, Monahan and Walker suggest that
because “the appeal process often takes years, the testimony of an
expert witness may be out-of-date by the time the court of last
review decides the case.”113 Given this reality, “[i]t is much more
expeditious for the parties to submit updated briefs than it is to
remand a case for additional expert testimony.”114
Such objections, however, seem overstated. Even if expert
witnesses are more comfortable writing books or briefs, their
comfort is not being sacrificed solely for the pleasure of the court.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id.
See FED . R. CIV. P. 52(a).
Monahan & Walker, supra note 103, at 495.
Id. at 496.
Id.
Id. at 497.
Id.
Id.
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Rather, subjection to cross-examination from opposing counsel and
questioning from the bench is more likely to force them to confront
the weaknesses in the substance of their testimony.115 Similarly,
even if one concedes for the sake of argument that expert demeanor
evidence is less important with regard to experts, the ability to
assess demeanor is but one of many credibility determinations. Pretrial depositions and voir dire, for instance, are powerful ways to
determine if an expert is truly an expert on the subject at hand, or,
even if well-credentialed, is making an extramural statement.
Finally, the objection focusing on the time-consuming nature of
trials seems beside the point, as experts (and opposing experts) can
both testify at trial and notify appellate courts that their testimony
(or their opponents’ testimony) is out of date in a later brief.
2. De Novo Review Ignores the Dangers of Appellate FactFinding
Moreover, the trial court’s fact-finding capacity should not be
compared to some Platonic ideal of truth-seeking, but to the
alternatives at hand. If legislative facts are not found through the
adversarial processes of the district courts, how will they be found?
The dominant answers appear to be that judges will find these facts
on their own or rely on amicus briefs. Yet both of these routes are
comparatively problematic.
In a 2012 article, Allison Orr Larsen discusses the phenomenon
of in-house judicial fact-finding at the United States Supreme
Court.116 Looking at the 120 “most salient” cases (defined according
to two social science indices) decided between 2000 and 2010,
Larsen found that 56 percent of them contained findings of legislative fact citing to authorities discovered “in house.”117 By “in house,”
Larsen means “outside the record, not presented by the parties, and
even beyond the scope of the numerous amicus briefs filed.”118 Such
independent fact-finding occurred across the ideological spectrum.
115. One is reminded of Wigmore’s famous aperçu that cross-examination is “the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1974).
116. See generally Larsen, supra note 7, at 1255.
117. Id. at 1274.
118. Id.
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Chief Justice John Roberts relied on a book by an investigative
journalist to assert that “benign skills—like negotiation—can be
used to engage in terrorism.”119 Justice Stevens cited data from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration website to
document a rise in the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.120
Justice Thomas relied on data from Educational Digest to underscore the “increasingly alarming crisis” of prescription drug abuse.121
And Justice Breyer invoked statistics from a journal on pediatrics
to note a lack of consensus across regions about gun safety.122
As Larsen persuasively argues, the immunity of such in-house
fact-finding to contestation makes it prone to bias and error.123
Given that such fact-finding occurs without the knowledge, much
less the participation, of the parties, the checks of the adversarial
process are gone.124 She provides the example of Sykes v. United
States, where the Court confronted the question of whether
vehicular flight contained an inherent risk of violence.125 Although
the parties served up their own statistics and studies, Justice
Kennedy and Justice Thomas “set forth new statistics for how many
crashes in Pennsylvania and California were caused by police
chases.”126 Justice Scalia, in dissent, accused the majority of “untested judicial factfinding.”127
Building on the point that some of the Justices have explicitly
acknowledged their reliance on the Internet,128 Larsen further notes
that the risks of error can rise in that realm. She discusses the
phenomenon of the “filter bubble,” in which search engines like
Google can tailor search results to the searcher.129 “A search for
‘global warming,’” she writes, “may reveal different results for different users depending on which websites are bookmarked, which
119. Id. (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 30 (2010)).
120. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007)).
121. Id. at 1275 (quoting Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 394
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
122. Id. at 1274-75 (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 944 (2010) (Breyer,
J., dissenting)).
123. Id. at 1291.
124. See id. at 1294-95.
125. Id. at 1266 (citing Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011)).
126. Id. at 1292.
127. Id. at 1267 (quoting Sykes, 564 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
128. Id. at 1260-62.
129. Id. at 1293-94.
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political blogs are visited, or even what groups the users belong to
on Facebook.”130 In this way, the innate dangers of what might be
termed “Googleprudence” may be exacerbated by technical amplifications of confirmation bias.
The other obvious path through which courts might obtain facts
is through amicus briefs. In a 2014 article, Larsen sends up this
practice as well.131 She notes that the number of amicus briefs
submitted to the Supreme Court swelled by 800 percent between the
late 1940s and the late 1990s.132 Many of these briefs are submitted
by respected experts and professional bodies, with rigorous and
careful citation to reliable sources. Yet others contain what Larsen
describes as “eleventh-hour, untested, advocacy-motivated claims of
factual expertise.”133
Larsen provides some troubling instances in which the Justices
have relied on such amicus briefs. Again, this reliance transcends
ideology. Justice Breyer, in a 2013 copyright decision, stated that
“library collections contain at least 200 million books published
abroad.”134 He cited to an amicus brief by the American Library
Association,135 which in turn cited a blog post.136 Yet the blog post in
question was published after the suit was filed, and the blog was
discontinued after the Supreme Court decided the case.137 In 2007,
Justice Kennedy cited an amicus brief for the proposition that
women can experience “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem” after
an abortion.138 The expert cited was not a medical doctor, but an

130. Id.
131. See generally Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757
(2014).
132. Id. at 1775 (citing Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus
Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 749 (2000)).
133. Id. at 1757.
134. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1364 (2013).
135. Id.
136. Brief of Amici Curiae the Am. Library Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioner at 12,
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (No. 11-697), 2012 WL 2641851,
at *12 (citing Ed O’Neill, How Many “Foreign” Books Are in US Libraries?, METALOGUE (June
24, 2010, 8:29 AM), http://worldcat.org/arcviewer/3/OCC/2010/11/24/H1290613808919/viewer/
file69.html).
137. Larsen, supra note 131, at 1792.
138. Id. at 1796 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007)).
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electrical engineer who received his PhD from an unaccredited
university.139
3. De Novo Review Creates Bad Incentives for the District
Courts
A de novo standard of review also creates perverse incentives for
the district courts. Currently, trial courts can—but need not—engage in adversarial testing of legislative facts. The Federal Rules of
Evidence afford them this choice. Under Rule 201, courts may take
judicial notice of a fact only if it is “not subject to reasonable
dispute.”140 However, the rule “governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact.”141 The advisory committee’s
note to the rule underscores that judges “may make an independent
search for persuasive data” in determining domestic law, and that
this standard also “govern[s] judicial access to legislative facts.”142
The impetus behind the differential treatment of adjudicative and
legislative facts under the rule is attributed to the idea that legislative facts are, by definition, disputed.143 Yet in allowing judges to
take judicial notice of legislative facts, the Rules of Evidence give
judges unfettered discretion in this area. Adjudicative facts can be
judicially noticed only if uncontroversial; if they are controversial
and material, they must be subjected to the adversarial process.144
Legislative facts, in contrast, can be judicially noticed at will.145 This
leads to a paradox: the facts that are (by definition) case-specific are
subjected to more adversarial testing than the facts that are (by
definition) case-spanning and therefore likely to be more consequential.
One way to fix this, of course, would be to apply the same
evidentiary standard to both adjudicative and legislative facts. Yet
given the relatively larger number of legislative facts potentially
implicated in a case, it seems utopian to require that all material
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
Id. 201(a).
Id. 201 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
See id.
See id. 201(b).
Cf. id. 201(a).
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and disputed legislative facts be submitted to trial. For this reason
alone, the current status quo of giving the district judge a choice as
to whether to put legislative facts to an adversarial test seems wise.
However, a de novo standard of review skews the choice of
whether district courts will subject legislative facts to the rigors of
adversarial testing. In such a system, a trial court could engage in
a meticulous full-dress trial of legislative facts. Yet on appeal, the
reviewing court could supplant those findings with facts found
through its own research or through an amicus brief. That reality,
in turn, will discourage district courts from holding trials. As Justice
Scalia observed in United States v. Virginia, the majority’s apparent
disregard for district court findings “makes evident that the parties
to this litigation could have saved themselves a great deal of time,
trouble, and expense by omitting a trial.”146
One potential counter is that such trials would still occur because
they would be helpful in the same way that well-reasoned analysis
of issues of law by a district court is helpful. After all, de novo
review does not mean that the reviewing court cannot read the
opinion of the court below. Yet given the enormous resources—financial, temporal, and managerial—required to go to trial, it is
reasonable to expect that de novo review of legislative facts will
keep many district courts from going to trial. This may be particularly likely given the general trend of decline in trials, which appear
to be going the way of the dodo.147 In the 1930s, about 20 percent of
civil cases filed in federal courts were resolved at trial; in the 2000s,
the figure had plummeted to less than 2 percent.148
4. De Novo Review Creates Bad Incentives for the Appellate
Courts
De novo review of legislative facts also incentivizes all courts
below the Supreme Court to rely solely or primarily on adjudicative
facts. A district court that bases its holding solely on adjudicative
facts is less likely to be reversed.149 Similarly, a court of appeals that
146. 518 U.S. 515, 585 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE
L.J. 522, 524 (2012).
148. Id.
149. The Ninth Circuit has held that district courts have the ability (and the function) to
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affirms solely on adjudicative facts found by the district court is, in
turn, less likely to be reversed.
A judicial minimalist might celebrate this incentive to the extent
that it operates as a canon of avoidance. Consider the canon of
interpretation that encourages courts to avoid constitutional issues
if a case can be decided on statutory grounds.150 The idea is to steer
courts away from “big law” unless and until they have to confront it.
The mapping of clear error/de novo review onto adjudicative/legislative facts may serve an analogous function. It may steer courts away
from “big facts” unless and until they have to confront them.
However, there are at least two problems with this analysis.
First, the canon of construction can be taken too far. In Perry v.
Brown, the Ninth Circuit confronted the painstakingly detailed
findings of fact of the district court in that case.151 It acknowledged
a difference between legislative and adjudicative facts, noting
ambiguity about what level of scrutiny should apply to each category of fact.152 Writing for a majority of the panel, Judge Reinhardt
explained:
Plaintiffs and Proponents dispute whether the district court’s
findings of fact concern the types of “facts”—so-called “adjudicative facts”—that are capable of being “found” by a court through
the clash of proofs presented in adjudication, as opposed to
“legislative facts,” which are generally not capable of being found
in that fashion.153

Judge Reinhardt acknowledged that it was “debatable whether some
of the district court’s findings of fact concerning matters of history
or social science are more appropriately characterized as ‘legislative
facts’ or as ‘adjudicative facts.’”154 However, he observed that the
panel did not need to “resolve what standard of review should apply
“find” adjudicative facts during trial, whereas they typically cannot do so for legislative facts.
See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1075 (9th Cir. 2012). Because findings of adjudicative fact
are proper for district courts to make, courts of appeals may substitute such findings with
their own only in rare, egregious circumstances.
150. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
151. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1075.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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to any such findings” given that “the only findings to which [the
Court gave] any deferential weight” were adjudicative facts.155 The
Ninth Circuit panel quoted Lockhart, in which the Court did not
decide “‘the “standard of review” issue’—whether ‘the “clearly
erroneous” standard of Rule 52(a) applies to the kind of “legislative”
facts at issue’”—because it did not base its decision “on the [validity
or] invalidity of the lower courts’ ‘factual’ findings.”156
To decide the case solely on adjudicative facts, however, the Ninth
Circuit bent governing law out of recognition. It argued that Romer
v. Evans, decided by the Supreme Court in 1996, disposed of the
central issue in Perry.157 Romer concerned a Colorado state constitutional amendment that forbade the state or any of its subdivisions
from protecting lesbians, gays, or bisexuals from discrimination.158
The Court struck down the amendment as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, noting that “[i]t is not within our constitutional
tradition to enact laws of this sort.”159 What the Court meant by
laws “of this sort” were laws that are “at once too narrow and too
broad.”160 Amendment 2 “identifie[d] persons by a single trait and
then denie[d] them protection across the board.”161
As pernicious as California’s ban on same-sex marriage was, it
did not function in this manner. Judge Reinhardt acknowledged this
point.162 He nevertheless concluded that “Proposition 8 is no less
problematic than Amendment 2 merely because its effect is
narrower; to the contrary, the surgical precision with which it
excises a right belonging to gay and lesbian couples makes it even
more suspect.”163
Given the status quo, this was doubtless good strategy for Judge
Reinhardt. It was a minimalist resolution of the case that avoided
the larger issue of whether same-sex couples had the right to marry
155. Id. These findings included matters like the messaging to voters around Proposition
8. Id.
156. Id. at 1076 (alteration in original) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3
(1986)).
157. Id. at 1081 (construing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
158. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
159. Id. at 633.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1081.
163. Id.
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nationally. Viewed through our lens, it was also a decision that
avoided the more controversial aspects of the trial by relying on only
the more anodyne adjudicative facts established below. Yet it was
a strategy that exacted a cost. For those who interpret Romer as a
case that turned on the breadth of the harm imposed by a law,
Judge Reinhardt’s interpretation that narrow harms were “even
more suspect” might give pause, given that “broad” and “narrow”
are antonyms.164
A separate problem with this canon of avoidance is that it does
not apply to the Supreme Court. There is no real incentive for the
Supreme Court to avoid determining a case on legislative facts, as
its decisions are not reviewed. De novo review of legislative facts
contributes to a system in which appellate reliance on legislative
facts is avoided until we reach the Supreme Court.165 But in this
scenario, legislative facts come into the Supreme Court with minimal vetting below. Again, the most consequential facts are subject
to the least amount of testing.
B. The Problem with Clear Error Review
At this point, the other extreme—clear error review for legislative
facts—begins to look more attractive. Yet here, too, lie dragons. I
consider two.
1. Clear Error Review Offers Too Much Deference to District
Court Findings Made Outside Such Courts’ Institutional
Competence
District courts are given clear error deference because they are
drawing on their institutional competence. However, as we have
seen, district courts may take judicial notice of legislative facts at
will.166 When the district courts do so, there is no reason to give
clear error deference to such facts. When they take judicial notice,
164. Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (stating that Colorado’s Amendment 2 denies gay
and lesbian couples protections “across the board”), with Perry, 671 F.3d at 1081 (explaining
that California’s Proposition 8’s “effect is narrower,” which “makes it even more suspect”).
165. Note the contrast with the canon of constitutional avoidance, which also applies to the
Supreme Court. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
166. See FED . R. EVID . 201(a); supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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district judges are not exercising any distinctive institutional
competence. A district court judge has no more institutional
competence in reading a book by an investigative journalist, for
instance, than one of his appellate colleagues.
As noted above, I do not think the solution is to deprive the
district courts of the unfettered ability to take judicial notice of
legislative facts. Yet some check is obviously necessary. Unrestrained by the general rule that it can notice only facts that are
“not subject to reasonable dispute,”167 the district court could take
notice of a fact that could be reasonably disputed but which was not
clearly erroneous. Such a finding would not have involved any
special competence on the part of the district court. It would
therefore be overly insulated on appeal by a rule requiring clear
error deference.
To test that intuition, consider the earlier discussion of partialbirth abortion. In Gonzales v. Carhart, the district court (along with
two other courts) found—after taking testimony on the subject—
that intact D&E abortions were sometimes medically necessary.168
Now consider a hypothetical court that found the same fact by
taking judicial notice of it. Such a finding could be reasonably
disputed, and so could be judicially noticed only by virtue of the fact
that it was a legislative fact. Even if one believes that clear error
deference should be granted to the lower court in Gonzales, it is
hard to see why clear error deference—or indeed any deference at
all—should be granted in our hypothetical case.
2. Clear Error Deference Can Upend the Hierarchical Structure
of the Courts
The deeper problem with clear error deference is that it threatens
to invert the pyramid of the federal judiciary. This is sometimes
framed as a problem of incapacity.169 Assume two different district
courts in the same judicial circuit come to different conclusions on
a close question pertaining to a legislative fact. In this circumstance,
an appellate court might find it impossible to give each court clear
167. See FED . R. EVID . 201(b).
168. See 550 U.S. 124, 161-62 (2007).
169. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 883-84 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (raising a version of this scenario), vacated, 530 U.S. 127 (2000).
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error deference. The district courts could hold opposing positions
without either being clearly wrong.
This “ought-implies-can” argument against clear error deference
seems at once logically elegant and unduly ornate. The core problem
with granting clear error deference to district court findings of legislative fact is not that the appellate courts cannot do it, but that
they will not do it. Even when district courts do not conflict, appellate courts have expressed reluctance about allowing a single
district court to decide a case by determining a dispositive
fact—sometimes called an “ultimate” fact.170 This has given rise to
the so-called “constitutional facts” exception to Rule 52(a), in which
appellate courts do not give clear error deference to ultimate facts
in cases involving constitutional law, even when those facts are
adjudicative in nature.171
A classic articulation of the “constitutional facts” exception can be
found in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.172 In
that case, the district court had found that Consumers Union had
published an article about the defendant with “actual malice.”173 On
appeal, the First Circuit found that under New York Times v.
Sullivan, reviewing courts in free-speech cases had to examine the
“whole record” independently.174 Accordingly, the court of appeals
declined to give clear error deference to the district court’s finding
of fact.175 The Supreme Court affirmed, both with respect to the
result and with respect to the standard of review.176 It found that de
novo review of such “ultimate” facts “reflects a deeply held conviction that judges—and particularly Members of this Court—must
exercise such [independent] review in order to preserve the precious
liberties established and ordained by the Constitution.”177
While “the constitutional fact doctrine has taken root most clearly
and firmly in the First Amendment context,”178 it has not been
170.
171.
(1985).
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See Borgmann, supra note 5, at 1207.
See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM . L. REV. 229, 229, 253
466 U.S. 485 (1984); see Monaghan, supra note 171, at 230.
Bose, 466 U.S. at 487.
Id. at 492 (construing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
See id.
Id. at 511, 513-14.
Id. at 510-11.
Borgmann, supra note 5, at 1206-07.
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limited to that context. In Miller v. Fenton, the Court found that the
voluntariness of a confession must be reviewed independently on
appeal.179 By contrast, in Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court declared
“the clearly-erroneous test” to be “the appropriate standard for
appellate review of a finding of vote dilution.”180 In short, the
application of the constitutional facts doctrine has been fitful and
uneven.
While the constitutional facts doctrine has largely been applied
to adjudicative facts, its logic holds—perhaps even more strongly—with regard to legislative facts. As the Seventh Circuit has
observed, “an issue of ‘constitutional fact[ ]’ is reviewed without
deference in order to prevent the idiosyncrasies of a single judge or
jury from having far-reaching legal effects.”181 By their nature, casespanning facts (that is, legislative facts) will be more likely to have
such far-reaching effects than case-specific ones (that is, adjudicative facts).
A major concern with embracing clear error review for legislative
facts is that it could expand the more radical constitutional facts
exception. The problem with the clear error standard is that it asks
too much of the appellate courts, upending the accepted hierarchy
of courts by permitting inferior courts to control appellate ones with
regard to all mixed issues of law and fact. Insisting on clear error
deference for legislative facts is unlikely to cow the appellate courts
into quiescence. To the contrary, it is more likely to encourage them
to expand the constitutional facts doctrine far beyond the First
Amendment context. After all, the constitutional facts exception to
clear error review, unlike the legislative facts exception, has been
formally elaborated by the Supreme Court.182

III. THE INTERMEDIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW

179.
180.
181.
2002).
182.

474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985).
478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986).
A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir.
See supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.
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At this point, it might fairly be asked if the Court has left the
question of deference due to legislative facts open for a reason. A
cynic might observe that the Court does not care much about
facts—that instead it reaches its conclusions on ideological or policy
grounds and then works backwards to fill in the facts from the
sources that support its conclusion. All legislative facts in Supreme
Court cases are, on this view, essentially rhetorical in nature. The
Supreme Court may have left the standard unclear precisely
because it wishes to retain “play in the joints.”183 If this is the case,
this effort may fill a much-needed gap in the literature.
I prefer to think, however, that the Supreme Court and intermediate appellate courts do take facts seriously, at least in the median
case. On the most ideologically freighted issues, many appellate
judges may be impervious to facts that cut against their desired
holding. Yet that is not the bulk of the work that judges do. In the
ordinary case, I believe that appellate judges engage in good faith
with the facts below and would adhere to reasonable rules of
deference.
For the reasons given above, however, the extant standards are
alternatively too permissive (de novo) and too restrictive (clear
error) to be workable. Judges appear to believe that they must
adhere to one standard or the other, as no court, to my knowledge,
has proposed an intermediate standard of review. Commentators
also seem to fall into the trap of assuming that legislative facts must
be treated either just like adjudicative facts or just like law. John
Monahan and Laurens Walker, for instance, perceptively note that
legislative facts share qualities of both law and fact.184 Like law,
legislative facts “produce principles applicable beyond particular
instances.”185 Like facts, they are descriptive in nature.186 They observed that because either standard is plausible, the less restrictive
one should be adopted, arguing for de novo review.187 Yet it is just
as plausible, of course, to say that the hybrid nature of legislative
facts suggests the propriety of an intermediate standard.
183. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (attempting to find a middle ground
between two opposing views).
184. Monahan & Walker, supra note 103, at 489-90.
185. Id. at 490.
186. See id. at 489.
187. Id. at 478.
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A thoughtful approach to this problem was advanced in an amicus
brief written in Hollingsworth v. Perry by Erwin Chemerinsky and
Arthur Miller. This brief stated:
Evidentiary proceedings, and especially trials, subject bare
allegations to rigorous review, expert analysis, and crossexamination. They help to avoid the danger that courts will rely
on preexisting assumptions that have little factual foundation.
Regardless of how one categorizes the different kinds of factual
findings trial courts make, judicial resolution of constitutional
issues must be informed by facts. In our system, disputes over
these facts are best resolved through adversarial proceedings
before a trial court judge who can oversee the proper presentation of those facts.
Here, the district court’s factual findings address the core
questions that this Court must answer.188

For these reasons, the brief advocated that the findings of the
district court deserved “significant weight.”189 It deliberately
eschewed the traditional deference terminology of “clear error
deference” and “de novo review.”190
Strangely, it was this brief that Justice Alito lambasted in his
Windsor dissent: “And, if this spectacle were not enough, some
professors of constitutional law have argued that we are bound to
accept the trial judge’s findings—including those on major philosophical questions and predictions about the future—unless they
are ‘clearly erroneous.’”191 He cited only the Chemerinsky and Miller
brief, so his critique was manifestly leveled at them.192 Yet the
Chemerinsky and Miller brief did not advocate for clear error
deference and studiously avoided the phrase “clear error” throughout in favor of the “significant weight” language.193 Of course, in
fairness to Justice Alito, the reality that clear error and de novo
review are the two existing options might suggest that any case for
188. Amicus Curiae Brief of Constitutional Law and Civil Procedure Professors Erwin
Chemerinsky and Arthur Miller in Support of Plantiffs-Respondents Urging Affirmance at 3,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).
189. Id. at 2-3.
190. See generally id. (omitting the phrases “clear error” and “de novo” throughout).
191. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 n.7 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
192. See id.
193. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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deference would be a case for clear error deference. But in fairness
to Chemerinsky and Miller, the scholars eschewed any reference to
extant standards to posit an intermediate form of review, though
the genre did not give them the opportunity to elaborate its contours.
I would like to take this opportunity to begin—really, only to
begin—that process of elaboration. The “significant weight”
standard offers an extremely promising third way for findings of
legislative facts, which, as indicated, fall somewhere between
conclusions of law and findings of adjudicative facts. But even if we
agree that significant weight should be accorded to findings of
legislative fact, the harder question of how much weight should be
given remains.
I propose that the weight to be afforded to district court findings
of legislative fact should vary according to the degree of adversarial
testing to which those facts were subjected. I mean “adversarial
testing” in both a case-specific and case-spanning sense. In a casespecific sense, I intend it to include proceedings in the district court
itself. Trial courts should receive more deference if they use their
institutional competence to conduct trials or other evidentiary
hearings. In contrast, they should receive no deference if they
simply take judicial notice of a legislative fact.
In a case-spanning sense, adversarial testing would take into
account what different lower courts had done. As we have seen in
the Supreme Court opinions urging deference, much is often made
of the fact that lower courts came to the same conclusion with
regard to a particular legislative fact. Both Justice Alito in Glossip
v. Gross and Justice Ginsburg in Gonzales v. Carhart noted that
multiple courts below had reached a particular conclusion.194
Conversely, in Supreme Court cases opposing deference, much is
made of the fact that lower courts have come to different conclusions. In Lockhart v. McCree, the Court underscored that “one other
Court of Appeals, reviewing the same social science studies as
introduced by McCree, has reached a conclusion contrary to that of
the Eighth Circuit.”195 Such case-spanning comparisons are
themselves a form of adversarial vetting. And the very nature of
194. See supra notes 56, 86 and accompanying text.
195. 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3 (1986).
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legislative facts, which recur across cases, lends itself to such crosscase testing. The ostensible vice of legislative facts—that they recur
across cases—can here be urged into its nearest virtue.
The significant weight standard, so construed, avoids the
problems of de novo review. Unlike de novo review, it honors the
special institutional competence of the trial courts.196 It defers more
to fact-finding made according to such competence than to facts
found through in-house research or amicus briefs.197 The significant
weight standard would also remove the current lack of incentive for
district courts to hold trials.198 Finally, it might even encourage
appellate courts to engage in more such testing.199 For example,
rather than engaging in in-house research, an appellate court might
ask the parties to submit briefs with regard to a material fact, or,
alternatively, to remand for fact-finding by the district court.
The significant weight standard also avoids or mitigates the
problems associated with clear error review. For starters, it would
only accord deference when the trial court had engaged in an
adversarial process.200 Moreover, it would not allow a single district
court’s conclusion to control the outcome above.201 Instead, the
appellate courts could look to agreement or disagreement among the
lower courts. And of course, even a consensus would not bind the
appellate courts in the same manner as clear error deference.

CONCLUSION

196. See supra Part II.A.1.
197. See supra Part II.A.2.
198. See supra Part II.A.3. The intermediate standard would put the trial court in the
familiar posture of “pay me now or pay me later.” The district court could eschew adversarial
testing and receive less appellate deference, or embrace adversarial testing and receive more
deference. I thank Adam Samaha for pointing out that this standard can be analogized to the
so-called “Chevron Step Zero,” in which judicial deference to agencies depends in part on the
process used by the agency. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187,
213-15 (2006) (discussing the relationship between agency processes and judicial deference).
199. See supra Part II.A.4.
200. See supra Part II.B.1.
201. See supra Part II.B.2.
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One of the great conundrums of preceding generations was the
law/fact distinction. In an age of facts, the storied law/fact distinction may be ceding its place to the fact/fact distinction. Putting this
discussion in the context of a broader social trend about facts gives
rise to a final observation. Unlike many adjudicative facts, legislative facts are likely to touch on more complex and enduring conflicts
about the good society. The truth about them may be eternally
unsettled. If that is the case, participation will become all the more
important. The value of encouraging adversarial vetting may be the
opportunity for parties and their constituents—broadly defined—to
feel that they have been heard on the issue, even if the determination goes against them. When facts are perceived to be infinitely
malleable, the dignitary value of having one’s view of the facts
heard in court may assume greater importance. In the age of facts,
even the most counter-majoritarian branch may need to invite
greater citizen participation in how such facts are found, reviewed,
and returned to the world.

